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What a frightening thing is the human, a mass of gauges 
and dials and registers, and we can read only a few and 
those perhaps not accurately.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Charging someone with a felony-level assault is not akin to 
sticking a toe in the water; it is a dive from a significant height.  A 
prosecutor’s irrevocable decision to commence such a serious case 
against an individual will be the paramount, most consequential 
choice in its litigation.  With that said, all but the most strident 
adversary would stipulate that, while considering whether to 
proceed with a criminal complaint, prosecutors are simultaneously 
“minister[s] of justice,”2 lawyers, and human beings.  In occupying 
these three roles, prosecutors are constrained by their best reading 
of the criminal code,3 guided by their principles of ethics,4 and 
inevitably subject to the creeping dynamics of culture.  It should be 
no surprise, then, that, as a prosecutor sits down with a set of police 
reports to consider whether to charge a person with a violent 
crime, three questions inevitably spring to mind: “Did it happen?  
Can I prove it?  How will others evaluate my decision?”  These 
questions compel prosecutors to decide: to choose whether to 
produce a criminal complaint that, in addition to being the 
documentation of a crime, is a sort of script for a legal 
Gesamtkunstwerk, the generation of which is part mathematics, part 
divination, and part cultural expression.  This article focuses on a 
problem that occasionally arises when considering the 
 
 1.  JOHN STEINBECK, THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT 88 (1961). 
 2.  State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 798 (Minn. 2000) (citations omitted).  
 3.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.01 (2012) (“[Minnesota Statutes chapter 609] shall 
be construed according to the fair import of its terms, to promote justice, and to 
effect its purposes which are declared to be . . . to protect the individual against 
the misuse of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions 
prohibited . . . .”).  
 4.  See generally, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2011). 
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“mathematics” of charging felony-level assault cases in Minnesota. 
Generating a complaint is “mathematical” in the 
straightforward sense that a prosecutor must identify alleged 
conduct that adds up to meet the elements of the charged 
offense(s).5  It is “divination” in the sense that a prosecutor must 
judge that certain witnesses are telling the truth, that they would 
testify consistently at trial, and that a group of fair-minded jurors 
would believe them.6  And it is unmistakably “cultural expression,” 
as charging decisions do not occur in a void but rather inside 
several Matryoshka-doll-like communities that impart norms and 
shepherd natural human emotions, from a desire to enact justice 
and enforce the rights of the public to a prosecutor’s fear of 
embarrassment, disrepute, and failure. 
Usually, the mathematics of charging a case is the easiest 
aspect to consider because most of the elements of most crimes are 
objective and unambiguous.  It is the part of the mental process 
that requires little emotion, like measuring the dimensions of a 
room.  Indeed, that was a significant goal in the “element analysis” 
approach of the Model Penal Code (MPC),7 which greatly 
influenced the drafters of Minnesota’s 1963 Code.8  In a typical 
case, once a read-through of a set of police reports illuminates who 
did what, when, where, and to whom, a prosecutor can consider 
whether the alleged conduct—abstracted from all other case 
dynamics—at least fits the elements of some potential charge and 
then move on to further, more “practical” considerations, where 
other aspects of a prosecutor’s experience, passion, and 
idiosyncratic standards may play a role in the ultimate charging 
decision. 
In Minnesota, however, the mathematical aspect of charging 
felony-level assault cases is complicated by a lack of clarity in how 
we define the crimes, specifically the definitions of two pertinent 
terms: “substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm,” which are 
 
 5.  See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.01 (“The complaint is a written signed statement 
of the facts establishing probable cause to believe that the charged offense has 
been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .”). 
 6.  MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2011) (“The prosecutor in 
criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause . . . .”). 
 7.  PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
MODEL PENAL CODE 12 (1999) (citing Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element 
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983)), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. 
 8.  Id. at 5; see also infra Part III.C. 
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the distinguishing elements to the felony offenses of assault in the 
third degree and assault in the first degree, respectively.  Because 
these terms lack clarity, the ships can become unmoored, and 
prosecutors tend to develop disparate, subjective “working 
definitions” of the terms, which can produce different charging 
thresholds, unequal treatment of similarly-situated suspects, and 
hence injustice. 
It does not have to be this way.  To reduce the potential for 
this type of injustice, the Minnesota legislature should refine the 
definitions of “substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm.”9  
By refining these definitions, the legislature could make 
prosecutors’ charging decisions in assault cases much more 
objective and consequently easier, fairer, and more just.  This 
article proposes that the Minnesota legislature adopt the definition 
of “substantial bodily harm” found in the Wisconsin Criminal Code 
and amend the definition of “great bodily harm” to increase 
specificity to what types of injuries are covered by the term. 
The article first will discuss the current assault-statute regime 
in Minnesota and its origin and development.  Then, the article will 
identify appellate decisions that have examined the concepts of 
bodily harm, substantial bodily harm, and great bodily harm.  
Following this, the article will describe the Wisconsin assault-statute 
regime.  Lastly, the article will propose how Minnesota should 
improve. 
II. DEGREES OF ASSAULT, GENERALLY DEFINED 
In Minnesota, a person commits an assault if he 
“intentional[ly] inflict[s] . . . bodily harm upon another.”10  There 
are five degrees of assault.11  The degrees of assault at issue in this 
article are assault in the fifth degree, assault in the third degree, 
and assault in the first degree; these are the degrees of assault that 
differ only in regard to the seriousness of the harm suffered by the 
victim.12  The other two degrees of assault are not distinguishable 
 
 9.  See MINN. STAT. § 609.221 (2012) (defining assault in the first degree); id. 
§ 609.223 (defining assault in the third degree); id. § 609.224 (defining assault in 
the fifth degree). 
 10.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10. 
 11.  See id. §§ 609.221–.224. 
 12.  See id. § 609.221 (defining assault in the first degree); id. § 609.223 
(defining assault in the third degree); id. § 609.224 (defining assault in the fifth 
degree).  Of course, there are several types of assault in the fifth degree, including 
acts committed “with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or 
4
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by the seriousness of harm suffered by the victim.13 
A quick glance at assault in the fifth, third, and first degrees 
illuminates that the differences between the three, most 
significantly the potential punishment upon conviction, are vast. 
Assault in the fifth degree requires only that the victim suffer 
some “bodily harm,”14 broadly defined as “physical pain or injury, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”15  In almost all 
circumstances, assault in the fifth degree is a misdemeanor 
offense,16 punishable by up to ninety days in jail.17 
Assault in the third degree requires that the victim suffer 
“substantial bodily harm,”18 defined as “bodily injury which involves 
a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a 
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily 
member.”19  The most significant feature of assault in the third 
degree, distinguishing it from assault in the fifth degree, is that it is 
a felony offense, punishable by up to five years in prison20 and 
carrying all of the immediate and collateral consequences that a 
felony conviction entails.21  If a defendant has no criminal history, 
 
death.”  See id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1(1) (emphasis added).  However, this article 
discusses only the type of assault in the fifth degree that inflicts actual bodily harm. 
 13.  See id. § 609.2231 (defining types of assault in the fourth degree primarily 
by the identity of the victim (e.g., police officers and ambulance drivers)); id. 
§ 609.222 (defining assault in the second degree as an assault with a dangerous 
weapon).  One caveat is that the legislature provided a separate subdivision and 
assigned a greater maximum sentence for assaults in the second degree which 
result in substantial bodily harm.  See id. § 609.222, subdiv. 2. 
 14.  Id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1. 
 15.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7. 
 16.  Id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1.  If a defendant has one or more convictions or 
adjudications for “qualified domestic violence-related offense[s],” a prosecutor 
may be able to charge assault in the fifth degree as a gross misdemeanor or felony, 
but neither enhancement would be based on the seriousness of the harm suffered 
by the victim.  See id. § 609.224, subdiv. 2, 4. 
 17.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 3.  Please note that, throughout this article, the 
terms “punishment” and “sentencing” refer only to periods of executed or stayed 
incarceration, not the imposition of fines. 
 18.  Id. § 609.223, subdiv. 1. 
 19.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a. 
 20.  Id. § 609.223, subdiv. 1. 
 21.  See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be 
entitled or permitted to vote at any election in this state: . . . a person who has 
been convicted of treason or felony, unless restored of civil rights . . . .”); Sames v. 
State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 567–70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the distinction 
between direct consequences and collateral consequences when determining 
whether a guilty plea is valid or invalid). 
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the presumptive sentence in the case is a year and a day, execution 
of which is stayed,22 and, upon conviction, a defendant typically 
receives a probationary sentence.23  If a defendant has a criminal-
history score of four, however, the presumptive sentence is an 
executed sentence of twenty-four months.24 
Assault in the first degree requires that the victim suffer “great 
bodily harm,”25 defined as “bodily injury which creates a high 
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or 
other serious bodily harm.”26  Assault in the first degree is a felony 
offense, punishable up to twenty years in prison.27  If a defendant 
has no criminal history, the presumptive sentence in the case is an 
executed sentence of eighty-six months.28  If a defendant has a 
criminal-history score of four, the presumptive sentence is an 
executed sentence of 134 months.29 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ASSAULT STATUTES UNDER THE CRIMINAL 
CODE IN MINNESOTA 
A. Model Penal Code 
This article will delve into a discussion of the current assault-
offense regime in Part IV, but it is helpful to develop a historical 
perspective on its origins.  After years of development, the 
American Law Institute promulgated the MPC in 1962.  In the 
MPC, there was only a misdemeanor-level assault offense titled 
“simple assault” and two felony-level assault offenses titled 
“aggravated assault.”30  The misdemeanor offense was premised on 
the defendant causing mere “bodily injury to another.”31  The two 
 
 22.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2 (2012) (defining assault in the third 
degree as a level IV felony). 
 23.  MINN. STAT. § 609.135; MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2. 
 24.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2. 
 25.  MINN. STAT. § 609.221, subdiv. 1. 
 26.  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 8. 
 27.  Id. § 609.221, subdiv. 1. 
 28.  MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4, subdiv. A (defining assault in the first 
degree as a level IX felony).  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
 31.  Id. § 211.1(1).  It should be noted that the MPC also allows for a simple 
assault to be sentenced as a “petty misdemeanor” if the assault was committed “in a 
fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent.”  Id. 
6
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felony offenses were premised on causing “serious bodily injury to 
another” and use of a “deadly weapon,” respectively.32 
One acquainted with Minnesota law would find the MPC’s 
definitions of “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” quite 
familiar.  The MPC defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness 
or any impairment of physical condition.”33  The authors of the 
MPC explain that the definition of “bodily injury” was taken 
directly from the then-current Wisconsin statute, section 939.22(4), 
which defined “bodily harm” to mean “physical pain or injury, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”34  The MPC’s 
authors explain that defining “bodily injury” in this manner had 
two major benefits: First, it thus referred to more than the 
consequences of a direct attack by including instances of “pain, 
illness, or physical impairment caused indirectly, as, for example, 
by exposing another to inclement weather or by non-therapeutic 
administration of a drug or narcotic.”35  Second, it excluded from 
liability under the assault offense “wrongs based solely upon insult 
or emotional trauma,”36 which the authors felt could be punished 
under other penal rationales.37 
As for “serious bodily injury,” it was defined as “bodily injury 
which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, 
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ.”38  Spread out 
categorically, the MPC’s definition of “serious bodily injury” 
essentially is a list of three types of injuries: 
1. Injury which creates a substantial risk of death; 
 
 32.  Id. § 211.1(2).  Interestingly, the MPC authors directly rejected enacting 
a statute analogous to Minnesota’s assault in the fourth degree, noting that “the 
Model Code departs from prior statutory law in dispensing with grading based on 
the status of the victim, for example, as a public official.”  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 1(c).  
The authors held that “[s]pecial provision is unnecessary in view of the ample 
severity of penalties against murder and all serious attacks upon the person, 
regardless of the identity of the victim.”  Id. 
 33.  Id. § 210.0(2).  It should be noted that, in providing the definitions of 
“bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury,” the MPC adds the caveat “unless a 
different meaning plainly is required.”  Id. § 210.0. 
 34.  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.22(4) (1961)). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 188; see also id. § 211.1 cmt. 2 at 185 (noting that certain types of 
“offensive contact” should be punished, such as “indecent sexual advance,” 
“unwanted erotic touching,” “disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” for which 
the MPC did indeed develop offenses that addressed this conduct directly). 
 38.  Id. § 210.0(3). 
7
Larson: Escape from the Twilight Zone: Minnesota's Definitions of Substan
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
 
2013] ESCAPE FROM THE TWILIGHT ZONE 1521 
2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement; or 
3. Injury which causes protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ. 
B. Influence of Wisconsin Statutes 
As for the origins of “great bodily harm,” the MPC’s authors 
again indicate that they looked to the Wisconsin statutes,39 which 
defined “great bodily harm” to mean “bodily injury which creates a 
high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or 
other serious bodily injury.”40  The authors indicate that they 
favored the Wisconsin language because it “encompasse[d] the 
drastic harms covered under the common-law felony of mayhem 
and add[ed] a residual category of harm creating substantial risk of 
death.”41  The language of the Wisconsin statute is quite similar to 
the ultimate MPC definitions except that, for reasons entirely 
unexplained in the MPC comments, the authors dropped the 
definition’s catch-all class of harm called “other serious bodily 
harm.” 
C. The Model Penal Code’s Influence on Minnesota 
Minnesota was one of the first states to reform its criminal 
code following promulgation of the MPC, enacting the Minnesota 
Criminal Code in 1963.42  As a child of the MPC, it should be no 
surprise that the 1963 Minnesota Code’s three categories of assault 
have their origin in the MPC.  At that time, following the MPC, the 
Minnesota legislature distinguished between only three types of 
assault.43  The first type simply was called “assault” under section 
609.22 of the 1963 Code, the definition of which is identical to the 
current definition of “assault”44 and the punishment of which is 
identical to the current punishment of misdemeanor-level assault 
 
 39.  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3 at n.61. 
 40.  WIS. STAT. § 939.22(14) (1961). 
 41.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. 3 at 188. 
 42.  Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185 (first codified in 
1965 at MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (1965)). 
 43.  Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1, with MINN. STAT. §§ 609.22–.225 
(1965). 
 44.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.22 (1965), with MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 
10 (2012). 
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in the fifth degree, up to ninety days in jail.45  The other two types 
were felony offenses called “aggravated assault” under section 
609.225 of the 1963 Code.  The second type of assault required that 
the victim suffer “great bodily harm,” the definition of which is 
identical to how it currently is defined,46 and was punishable by up 
to ten years in prison.47  The third type required that the defendant 
commit the assault “with a dangerous weapon,”48 the forerunner to 
the current offense of assault in the second degree,49 and was 
punishable by up to five years in prison.  Of course, when it came 
to sentencing, in a time before the Minnesota Sentencing 
Guidelines and Blakely,50 the district court had much more 
sentencing discretion than it does today.51  Most notably in the 1963 
Minnesota Criminal Code, there was no “intermediate” degree of 
assault, such as the current assault in the third degree, to split the 
wide gulf between assaults that cause negligible bodily harm and 
those that just about kill the victim. 
Juxtaposing the MPC’s definition of “serious bodily injury” 
with the Minnesota Code’s “great bodily harm” reveals that they are 
largely identical, with the differences being that the Minnesota 
Code replaces the phrase “substantial risk of death” with “high 
probability of death,” adds the adjective “permanent” to the phrase 
“protracted loss or impairment of the function,” and supplements 
the definition with a catch-all class of harm called “other serious 
bodily harm.”  Thus, spread out categorically, the Minnesota 
Code’s definition of “great bodily harm” is a list of four types of 
injuries: 
1. Injury which creates a high probability of death; 
2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement; 
3. Injury which causes a permanent or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; 
and 
4. Other serious bodily harm. 
 
 45.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.22 (1965), with MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv. 
1 (2012). 
 46.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (1965), with MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2012). 
 47.  MINN. STAT. § 609.225, subdiv. 1 (1965).   
 48.  Id. § 609.225, subdiv. 2. 
 49.  MINN. STAT. § 609.222 (2012). 
 50.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (requiring a jury 
determination for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines). 
 51.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.10, .135 (1965). 
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In other words, while largely adopting the MPC’s assault-statute 
regime in 1963, when choosing the definitions of the severities of 
harm, Minnesota chose to adopt the exact wording of the Wisconsin 
statutes rather than the MPC’s innovations.  Conspicuously, 
Minnesota chose to retain Wisconsin’s catch-all “other serious 
bodily harm,” while the MPC dropped it. 
The MPC and the resulting 1963 Minnesota Code are 
extraordinary in many ways, but, to a practitioner who works within 
the current assault-offense regime, it can be surprising, perhaps 
quaint, that neither code contains a concept analogous to 
“substantial bodily harm” or seems to address the “middle range” of 
bodily harm that often results from assaultive conduct.  Indeed, to 
modern ears, it may seem strange, if not downright unjust, to hear 
that, from 1963 to 1979, a defendant in Minnesota could break a 
victim’s arm, knock him unconscious, or render him temporarily 
wheelchair-bound but receive only a misdemeanor conviction.  When 
seeing these sorts of injuries, a contemporary prosecutor might say, 
“This defendant may not need to go to prison, but it definitely was 
felony-level conduct.”  Not so, a generation ago . . . 
D. Rationale of the MPC 
The absence of “substantial bodily harm” or any analogous 
concept from the MPC or Minnesota’s 1963 Code may suggest that 
there was a large “donut hole” of bodily harms that were not 
addressed, or treated appropriately, by the code’s authors.  
However, the MPC’s authors certainly were not oblivious to the 
need to address the wide variety of human experience and the 
“intermediate” types of bodily harm defined as “substantial bodily 
harm.”  Indeed, as the authors explain in their notes, one of their 
primary concerns was to develop a system that properly graded the 
wide range and variety of assaultive conduct.52  The authors stated 
that it was “necessary for the Model Code to deal separately with 
conduct ranging from the simple assault to the infliction of serious, 
permanent injury”53 (i.e., “bodily injury short of homicide”).54 It 
also is clear that, when the authors were referring to “deal[ing] 
with” the range of assaultive behavior, they were referring to the 
 
 52.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 211, introductory note (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
10
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“grad[ing]” of assaultive conduct “ranging from a petty 
misdemeanor to a felony of the second degree.”55 
Indeed, in comment 1(c) to MPC section 211.1, the authors 
explain that a problem at common law that they sought to address 
through the code was that “[a]ttacks resulting in injuries that fell 
short of mayhem” were treated as “ordinary batteries,”56 meaning 
low-level misdemeanors.  The authors explained that the lack of 
defined intermediate offenses required common law judges to 
exercise discretion in affixing proper punishment to more serious 
harms.57  However, as “the practice developed” to limit the 
potential punishments for misdemeanors, legislatures were 
compelled to “respond[] by creating a series of intermediate 
offenses”58 to bridge the gap between “trivial[ly] sanction[ed]” 
minor assaults and “drastic[ally] penal[ized] . . . offenses such as 
murder and rape.”59  The MPC authors followed that trend, 
explaining that the adoption of a system of “laws that grade various 
manifestations of causing . . . injury” was a “necessary part of a 
penal code.”60  The MPC thus implemented the system previously 
described, explaining that their grading of assault offenses was 
“rationalized according to the gravity of harm intended or caused 
and the dangerousness of the means used” and designed to provide 
commensurate penalties ranging from a “maximum term of only 30 
days” to a “maximum of 10 years.”61 
Even with this attention on the need to grade assault offenses 
appropriately, when it came to establishing grades of physical harm 
(short of death), the MPC defined only two, and it is clear that the 
authors felt that two was enough and that, despite the existence of 
other model statutory regimes that contained three grades of 
physical harm,62 a regime that had only two grades, along with the 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 1(c). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 181.  For example, the authors noted that “New York created four 
levels of offenses: maiming (15 years), assault with a deadly weapon or a 
destructive or noxious thing (10 years), inflicting grievous bodily harm or assault 
with any weapon (five years), and simple assault or battery (one year).”  Id. (citing 
N.Y. §§ 240–245, 1400 (repealed 1967)).  
 60.  Id. at 183. 
 61.  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 2 at 184. 
 62.  See id. at 185–86 (describing the “proposed federal criminal code . . . . 
[that] intergrat[ed] all forms of assaultive behavior in a single provision . . . [and] 
define[d] separate offenses of maiming, aggravated battery, and battery”); id. 
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flexibility of sentencing discretion, was “appropriate” and allowed 
for “very broad coverage.”63  In the MPC comments, the authors are 
wholly and curiously silent on whether a level of harm in between 
“bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” was considered and, if so, 
why it was rejected.64 
E. Changes to Minnesota’s Assault Statutes 
After the enactment of the Minnesota Criminal Code, sixteen 
years passed without any changes to the assault-statute regime.  In 
1979, the code was substantially amended to create a new four-
degree regime,65 evidencing perhaps that the legislature found the 
need for an intermediate felony-level assault.  What was formerly 
called “aggravated assault” and defined under Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.225, subdivision 1 (1965), was recast as “assault in the 
first degree” and moved to section 609.221 (1979).  Its ten year 
maximum penalty66 and the definition of “substantial bodily harm” 
remained unchanged.67 
The other type of felony-level assault, pertaining to an assault 
with a dangerous weapon under Minnesota Statutes section 
 
§ 211.1 cmt. 1(c) (describing the then-current New York Statutes sections 240–45 
that defined separate levels of punishment for (1) maiming, (2) inflicting grievous 
bodily harm or assault, and (3) simple assault or battery). 
 63.  Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3. 
 64.  In addition to the authors’ direct description of the MPC assault regime 
as “appropriate” and “very broad,” the tenor of the comments indicate that the 
goal of the code was to promote enough flexibility to fairly address the variety of 
assaultive behavior.  See id. § 211.1 cmt. 1, at 174.  For example, the authors noted 
that some states had statutes distinguishing assaults on special types of victims, see 
id. § 211.1 cmt. 2, at 185, as Minnesota’s current assault in the fourth degree does.  
The authors then directly addressed that the MPC did not enact an assault offense 
related to the status of the victim, stating that “[s]pecial provision is unnecessary in 
view of the ample severity of penalties against murder and all serious attacks upon 
the person, regardless of the identity of the victim.”  Id.  This comment suggests a 
degree of confidence that the MPC provided flexibility to assign an offense name 
and an appropriate penalty to any assault.  It’s easy to cut the MPC authors a 
break, given their enormous feat of collecting, summarizing, and taking the best 
of the common law and various state statutes at the time to create the code.  But it 
is apparent that the authors felt that, if there was any need for an “intermediate” 
crime, it was to fill the space between mere “simple assault” and homicide and that 
they did not see a need for and were not concerned with creating a crime that was 
“intermediate” to assault and aggravated assault.  Obviously, in 1963, the 
Minnesota legislature agreed with the MPC and passed its code. 
 65.  See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 258, secs. 4–7, §§ 609.221–.224, 1979 Minn. 
Laws 548, 549–50. 
 66.  See id. sec. 4, § 609.221, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550. 
 67.  See id. sec. 2, § 609.02, subdiv. 7a, 1979 Minn. Laws at 549. 
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609.225, subdivision 2 (1965), was recast “assault in the second 
degree” and moved to section 609.222 (1979).  Its penalty also 
remained the same.68 
As for the misdemeanor-level assault found in the 1963 Code, 
which had been labeled simply “assault” under Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.22 (1965), it was recast as “assault in the fourth degree” 
and relocated to section 609.224 (1979), but it otherwise remained 
the same.69 
What was new in the 1979 Code was remarkable: the creation 
of a new felony offense that bridged the gulf between the former 
“assault” and “aggravated assault,” assault in the third degree under 
Minnesota Statutes section 609.223 (1979).  Assault in the third 
degree was defined then, as it is now, as an assault that “inflicts 
substantial bodily harm.”70  “Substantial bodily harm” also was 
defined then as it is now.71  As one might expect for this 
intermediate-level assault, the legislature set its maximum penalty 
at three years in prison.72 
It is evident that the definition of “substantial bodily harm,” 
like “great bodily harm,” is just a sub-list of types of injuries.  Spread 
out categorically, the Minnesota Code’s definition of “substantial 
bodily harm” is a list of three types of injuries: 
1. Injury which involves a temporary but substantial 
disfigurement; 
2. Injury which causes a temporary but substantial loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; 
and 
3. Injury which causes a fracture of any bodily member.73 
Beyond these words, however, the legislature provided no 
additional definitions to assist prosecutors in determining what 
specific injuries fall within these types.  All further interpretation 
and elaboration had to be performed by prosecutors on an ad hoc 
basis and by the appellate courts on a post hoc basis.74 
 
 68.  See id. sec. 5, § 609.222, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550. 
 69.  See id. sec. 7, § 609.224, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550. 
 70.  See id. sec. 6, § 609.223, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550. 
 71.  Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a (Supp. 1979), with MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.02, subdiv. 7a (2012). 
 72.  MINN. STAT. § 609.223 (Supp. 1979). 
 73.  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a (1979). 
 74.  Since 1979, this three-tiered gradation in the assault-statute regime has 
remained wholly intact and unmodified by the legislature.  That is not to say that 
the legislature has not amended the regime in a number of noteworthy ways, 
including recasting misdemeanor-level assault as “assault in the fifth degree,” 
13
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IV. APPELLATE ELABORATION ON THE LEVELS OF HARM 
When compelled by an appeal, the Minnesota appellate courts 
have interpreted, attempted to clarify, and attempted to delineate 
the three types of bodily harm.  Almost exclusively, when 
addressing one of the types of bodily harm, the issue before the 
court is whether the evidence presented at a trial was sufficient to 
support the appellant’s conviction.  Some decisions have brought 
clarity, while other decisions tend to reveal why statutory reform may 
be a better mechanism to increase clarity than reliance on 
appellate courts reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims 
following jury verdicts.75 
 
MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv. 1 (2012); creating what is now assault in the fourth 
degree to protect police officers and other civil servants, id. §§ 609.2231, .221, 
subdiv. 2 (providing a separate crime prohibiting use of deadly force against peace 
officers and corrections employees); creating other felony offenses under the 
“assault in the fourth degree” title to punish assaults motivated by forms of racial 
and other bias, id. § 609.2231, subdiv. 4; creating the offense of domestic assault, 
id. § 609.2242; creating the concept of using a defendant’s recidivism as a basis for 
enhancing misdemeanor-level assaults to gross-misdemeanor-level and felony-level 
offenses, id. § 609.2242, subdiv. 2, 4; and creating a second type of assault in the 
second degree, id. § 609.222, subdiv. 2. 
 75.  An obvious limitation in obtaining new detail from the appellate courts is 
that it is not their role to add new detail in the first place.  The canons of statutory 
interpretation dictate that “words and phrases are construed according to rules of 
grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” id. § 645.08(1), 
and the courts have held that, when “the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, [they do] not engage in any further construction and instead 
look[] to the plain meaning of the statutory language.”  State v. Wukawitz, 662 
N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003).  It is hard for the courts to “gap-fill” statutes with 
this limitation. 
  Another limitation is that, when the courts have been asked to review the 
definitions of the types of bodily harm, the standard of review on a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim does not easily allow the court to attempt to demarcate clear 
lines between the levels of harm.  Review of these claims puts the courts in a 
posture which requires them to weigh all evidence in favor of the conviction and 
show extreme deference to the jury’s verdict.  See State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 
466, 477 (Minn. 1999). 
  Also, from a practitioner’s point of view, relying on direction from 
appellate courts is a slow, inefficient way to learn what the legislature intends to 
criminalize.  Metaphors abound.  It’s akin to learning whether the flag will fly by 
“running it up the flagpole.”  It’s akin to testing the suspension of a car by driving 
off a cliff.  And, when faced with the interpretative task of applying the reasoning 
in sufficiency-of-the-evidence decisions to a new set of facts, it’s far too often akin 
to the ancient art of reading tea leaves. 
14
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A. Bodily Harm 
The Minnesota appellate courts have not had to address 
“bodily harm” very often since 1963, and when they have, they have 
kept their opinions simple and have not diverted from the basic 
philosophy of the MPC that some pain or injury must be present, as 
opposed to mere “offensive contact.”76  As for specific physical pain 
or injury, the courts have not addressed a set of facts that resulted 
in distinguishing mere “offensive contact” from “bodily harm.”  But 
it is clear from cases such as State v. Tscheu that “[o]nly a ‘minimal 
amount of physical pain or injury’ is necessary in order ‘to satisfy 
the definition of bodily harm.’”77  The courts have addressed 
several cases in which the claimed harm constitutes a victim’s mere 
description of pain or a bruise, which the courts have found to be 
sufficient evidence of bodily harm.  For example, in State v. Johnson, 
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of bodily 
harm when the victim experienced “pain from being struck.”78  
Physical pain or injury can be established when a victim subjectively 
feels pain, even if there are no actual signs of injury.79  As for 
demonstrable physical injuries, even slight injuries qualify as bodily 
harm.  In State v. Mattson, the court found sufficient evidence of 
physical injury based on evidence that the victim suffered a bruise,80 
 
 76.  When designing the MPC’s assault-offense regime, the MPC authors took 
note that they sought to depart from prior law by “limiting assault to cases 
involving either the fact or prospect of physical injury.”  MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 211.1 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).  They explained that 
“[m]ere offensive contact is excluded” from the definition of assault.  Id.  Note, 
however, that the authors were well aware that certain types of “offense contact” 
should be punished, such as “indecent sexual advance[s],” “unwanted erotic 
touching,” “disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” and did indeed develop 
offenses that addressed this conduct directly.  Id. 
 77.  758 N.W.2d 849, 859 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d 
518, 522 (Minn. 2003)). 
 78.  277 Minn. 230, 237, 152 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1967); see also State v. Bowser, 
307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981) (holding that evidence that the victim suffered 
bodily harm after experiencing physical pain with sexual penetration and 
receiving an accompanying laceration that resulted in bleeding was sufficient to 
support a finding of bodily harm). 
 79.  Bowser, 307 N.W.2d at 779. 
 80.  376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985); see also State v. Nordstrum, 385 
N.W.2d 348, 351–52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same); State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d 
357, 357–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that evidence that defendant struck 
victim in the face, knocking her down and causing her to sustain bruises to her 
arm and knee and a bloody knee, was sufficient to support a conviction for assault 
in the fifth degree); State v. O’Brien, 352 N.W.2d 130, 131–32 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) (holding that evidence that appellant punched victim in the face, causing a 
15
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and in State v. Slaughter, scratches on the victim’s neck constituted 
bodily harm.81 
As for the other types of bodily harm, namely “illness” and 
“any impairment of physical condition,” the appellate courts have 
been asked to interpret these categories of harm in only one case, 
involving a defendant who drugged a victim.82  It’s clear from a 
review of appellate decisions that few appellants have sought 
reversal of conviction based on the lack of evidence of bodily harm, 
and there is very little related to this type of harm on which 
practitioners trifle. 
B. “Substantial Bodily Harm” 
Surprisingly, the appellate courts have not provided much 
more guidance on the definition of “substantial bodily harm.”  In 
fact, in 2003, the court of appeals conceded that “few Minnesota 
cases specifically define substantial bodily harm.”83  To review the 
decisions that do exist, it seems appropriate to look at each of the 
three categories of “substantial bodily harm” separately. 
 
 
cut, was sufficient to support a conviction for assault in the fifth degree). 
 81.  691 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Minn. 2005). 
 82.  See Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d at 521.  A review of appellate decisions did not 
reveal any cases that further defined or discussed “illness,” and, prior to 2003 with 
the Jarvis decision, the courts “ha[d] not had occasion to address the type of 
evidence needed to support a finding of ‘impairment of physical condition’ as a 
type of bodily harm.”  Id.  In Jarvis, there was evidence that the defendant 
provided pills to an unsuspecting female victim, claiming that they were 
“vitamins.”  Id. at 519.  The pills, however, caused her side effects that were not 
anticipated by the victim, causing her to become “disoriented,” “groggy,” and 
unable to move her body without assistance.  Id. at 522.  Testimony from a forensic 
scientist revealed the presence of barbiturate drugs in the victim’s system after the 
incident.  Id. at 520.  The court reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to 
find that the victim suffered “bodily harm.”  Id. at 521–22.  The court reviewed the 
Webster’s definition of “impair” and held that “‘any impairment of physical 
condition’ in Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 7, means any injury 
that weakens or damages an individual’s physical condition.”  Id. at 522 (citing 
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 959 (Wendayln R. Nichols & 
Sheryl B. Stebbins eds., 2d ed. 2001)).  The court found that the evidence amply 
supported a finding that the victim’s physical condition was “weakened or 
damaged by an involuntary ingestion of drugs.”  Id. 
 83.  State v. Dunn, No. CX-02-872, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 11, 2003). 
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1. Temporary but Substantial Disfigurement 
The first category of injuries, those which would constitute 
“temporary but substantial disfigurement,” has been discussed 
several times.  In 1985, in State v. Carlson, the court of appeals 
reviewed a case in which a ten-year-old victim was beaten by her 
father and suffered “two black eyes, facial bruises, bruises on her 
neck and head, and scratches on her arm.”84  With virtually no 
discussion and no elaboration on the concept of “temporary but 
substantial disfigurement,” the court held that these injuries 
constituted “substantial bodily harm.”  Five years later, though, in 
1986, the issue of whether an injury that involved a black eye 
constituted substantial bodily harm came up again, and the 
demarcation line became fuzzy.  In State v. Whaley, the appellant 
was convicted of assault in the third degree after punching the 
victim in the face, causing the victim to suffer a black eye, a swollen 
face, and a fractured left cheekbone.85  In the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued, “Let’s look at the disfigurement, 
first of all.  You saw the photos of the victim.  This, ladies and 
gentlemen, is disfigurement.  When you have a black eye and your face 
is swollen, that is disfigurement.”86  Defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor’s argument, citing it as a misstatement of the law.87  
Without citing precedent, the court noted that “under Minnesota 
law a black eye, in and of itself, does not equate to ‘substantial 
bodily harm.’”88  The inference prompted by the holding, of 
course, is that a black eye, in and of itself, is not “temporary but 
substantial disfigurement.”89  However, there has never been any 
discussion about why that, or any black eye, would never constitute 
substantial disfigurement. 
The two cases compel the question: Why is a black eye with 
accompanying bruises and scratches sufficient evidence to prove 
substantial bodily harm when a black eye with accompanying facial 
 
 84.  369 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 85.  389 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  Note that the fractured 
cheekbone was a sufficient injury to sustain the conviction for assault in the third 
degree.  Id. at 927.  This case is discussed here for the court’s comment on the 
black eye. 
 86.  Id. at 926. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  The court nevertheless sustained the conviction, holding that the 
fractured cheekbone was a “fracture,” which qualifies as substantial bodily harm.  
Id. at 927. 
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swelling is insufficient?  The word “substantial” has been defined as 
“considerable size or amount,”90 but no court has sought to 
demarcate why a black eye is distinguishable from other forms of 
disfigurement.  Can one easily quantify these sorts of facial injuries?  
When reviewing a case involving injuries such as bruises, scratches, 
and swelling, practitioners essentially are left with the vague 
holdings of Carlson and Whaley and left to infer their penumbra and 
import in other cases.  The situation seems unnecessarily 
arbitrary.91 
Another common type of injury which is discussed under the 
concept of “temporary but substantial disfigurement” is a laceration 
that requires stitches.  Unfortunately, though, the court of appeals 
has never addressed whether a laceration that requires stitches 
constitutes per se “temporary but substantial disfigurement.”  
Moreover, in cases where the court of appeals has reviewed injuries 
requiring stitches, the court has chosen to not publish its opinions, 
offering no precedential guidance to practitioners.92  For example, 
in State v. Wimes, an unpublished case, the court recognized a “large 
deep cut” near the victim’s right eyebrow, which was described as a 
“1.5-inch, L-shaped laceration” that had to be sutured, as 
“temporary but substantial disfigurement.”93  In State v. Smith, an 
unpublished case, the court held that a “3-inch bleeding laceration 
on [the victim’s] scalp requiring 10–15 staples, along with a 
concussion and accompanying amnesia at the time of the assault” 
established substantial bodily harm.94  In In re Welfare of A.B.R., an 
unpublished case, the court held that a laceration on a victim’s 
forearm that was 2.5 inches long, 1 to 1.5 centimeters deep, and 
required seven stitches to repair constituted “temporary but 
substantial disfigurement.”95 
This series of unpublished cases may endow practitioners with 
some confidence in evaluating a laceration that requires stitches, 
but certainly there is no published case that holds that a laceration 
that is repaired with stitches or sutures constitutes substantial 
 
 90.  E.g., State v. Williams, 451 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).  
 91.  Anecdotally, one way that prosecutors have established that a black eye 
constitutes substantial bodily harm is to introduce evidence, when possible, that 
the injury to the eye caused temporary but substantial impairment to the victim’s 
vision. 
 92.  See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subdiv. 3(c) (2012). 
 93.  No. C6-92-1515, 1992 WL 383419, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992). 
 94.  No. C5-95-2153, 1996 WL 380571, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 1996). 
 95.  No. A07-0983, 2007 WL 4564151, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2007). 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/4
 
1532 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:5 
bodily harm.  Also, these cases do not provide any sense that 
stitches or sutures would be required.  Indeed, although stitches 
may be some sort of indicator that the laceration has “considerable 
size or amount,” the court has never held that medical intervention 
or evidence is necessary.96 
2. Temporary but Substantial Loss or Impairment of the Function of 
Any Bodily Member or Organ 
The second category, “temporary but substantial loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,” has 
been discussed infrequently by the appellate courts.  Even as late as 
2001, the court of appeals, in State v. Larkin, had not been asked to 
consider whether a loss of consciousness constituted “substantial 
bodily harm.”97  In short shrift, however, the court determined (1) 
rendering someone unconscious temporarily impairs “a function of 
the brain, that is, the ability to receive and interpret sensory 
impulses” and (2) because loss of consciousness is a “total” 
impairment of sensory brain function, it is thus “substantial.”98  
Thus, the court concluded that “temporary loss of consciousness, 
on its own, is substantial bodily harm for the purpose of [assault in 
the third degree].”99 
3. Fracture of Any Bodily Member 
The third category, “fracture of any bodily member,” appears 
to be the most illuminated type of injury by virtue of several 
 
 96.  See State v. Dunn, No. CX-02-872, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 11, 2003).  In Dunn, the court refused to overturn a jury’s finding of 
substantial bodily harm when the only evidence of injury was a set of photographs 
of lacerations on the victim’s face and head and evidence of bleeding at the crime 
scene.  Id.  Of course, Dunn remains an unpublished case with no precedential 
value, and the legal issue on appeal was sufficiency of the evidence, requiring the 
court to give high deference to the jury and review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the conviction.  Id. at *2–4.  But, there it is, usable or unusable, 
perhaps an opinion on which no judgment (e.g., a charging decision) should rely. 
 97.  620 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).  For the sake of nuance, it is 
noteworthy that the supreme court in 1983 opined without discussion, “Arguably, 
‘great bodily harm’ is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly.”  State v. 
Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983) (citing State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706 
(Minn. 1978)). 
 98.  Larkin, 620 N.W.2d at 337. 
 99.  Id.  A noteworthy omission in Larkin is that, although the victim also 
suffered a concussion, the court chose to not discuss whether a concussion on its 
own could be considered substantial bodily harm, a question that remains 
unanswered by the Minnesota appellate courts. 
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straightforward statements in several published cases (e.g., State v. 
Stafford, when the victim’s nose was broken;100 State v. Wellman, when 
the victim’s nose and two bones were broken;101 State v. Witucki, 
when the victim suffered a broken finger;102 State v. Whaley, when 
the victim suffered a fractured cheekbone;103 and State v. Waino, 
when the victim’s ribs were cracked104). 
The aforementioned cases constitute essentially all of the 
appellate case law in Minnesota associated with interpreting the 
meaning of “substantial bodily harm.”  If a prosecutor reviews a 
case involving an injury not specifically discussed in the cases, such 
as a burn or a concussion, or an impairment not specifically 
discussed, such as the temporary loss of sight due to a black eye or 
difficulty chewing due to a sore jaw, then the prosecutor must 
simply teach the definition of “substantial bodily harm” to the jury 
and argue her cause.  Many prosecutors may consider trying a case 
on a novel or uncharted theory to be a joyful way to spend one’s 
workweek, but, from the perspective of a “minister of justice,” on 
the mathematical issue of whether an injury should “count” as 
substantial bodily harm, many prosecutors simply want more clarity 
in the statute. 
C. “Great Bodily Harm” 
In contrast to “bodily harm” and “substantial bodily harm,” 
there is more appellate litigation on the various forms of “great 
bodily harm,” although it is not clear that more case law has led to 
more clarity.  In most cases, courts review each category of bodily 
harm separately,105 and, in any given case, an injury may satisfy one 
category but not another.  When dealing with cases involving “great 
 
 100.  340 N.W.2d at 670–71. 
 101.  341 N.W.2d 561, 562–64 (Minn. 1983) (defendant was convicted of three 
separate counts of assault in the third degree for three assaults that occurred on 
separate occasions). 
 102.  420 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 103.  389 N.W.2d 919, 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 104.  611 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 105.  The supreme court has not always followed this practice.  See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982) (holding that unspecified injuries 
that the victim received when the appellant beat him in the head multiple times 
with a two-foot-long pipe were sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of 
assault in the first degree); State v. Peters, 274 Minn. 309, 316–17, 143 N.W.2d 832, 
837 (1966) (holding that facial injuries suffered by a police officer in a pistol-
whipping assault constituted great bodily harm without specifying in detail the 
officer’s injuries or the category of great bodily harm the injuries satisfies). 
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bodily harm,” it is common to see a case in which a victim’s injuries 
qualify under more than one of the four categories (e.g., when a 
permanently disfiguring wound also causes a high probability of 
death).106  Sometimes, an appellate court will work deliberately 
through each category of “great bodily harm;”107 other times, a 
court will appear to leave its holding purposely vague.108  In many 
cases, it seems obvious that the court’s goal is simply to decide the 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in the case before it, not to impart 
any guidance to practitioners whatsoever.  Yet, most practitioners 
still will try to rely on the case law that does exist for whatever 
guidance and grounding can be inferred. 
1. High Probability of Death 
When looking at the first category of “great bodily harm,” 
“high probability of death,” the appellate courts have focused on 
the fact that the injury itself must be life threatening; the injury 
cannot simply be a “near miss.”  The courts have noted that, 
because the distinguishing characteristic of Minnesota’s assault 
statutes is the severity of the victim’s injury, there will be times 
when a person who commits a “grievous assault” will escape serious 
assault charges simply “because the victim is fortunate enough to 
escape serious injury.”109  It’s a constraint created “by the language 
of the statute.”110 
For example, in State v. Gerald, the court considered a half-inch 
laceration on the victim’s ear that, according to medical testimony, 
was very close to a major vein and artery.111  The State argued that, 
if the vein or artery had been cut, the victim could have bled to 
death.  The appellant was convicted at trial.  On appeal, however, 
the court reasoned that “[t]he fact that a lesser injury is located 
near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more 
serious is not sufficient to satisfy the statut[ory]” definition of high 
 
 106.  See, e.g., State v. Felix, 410 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“This 
case did not simply involve one of the factors defining ‘great bodily harm;’ it 
involved all of them.”). 
 107.  See, e.g., State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 108.  See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982). 
 109.  Gerald, 486 N.W.2d at 802–03 (“Although we find it anomalous that an 
individual who commits a grievous assault on another may escape a first-degree 
assault conviction because the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury, 
we are constrained by the language of the statute.”). 
 110.  Id. at 803. 
 111.  Id. at 801–02. 
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probability of death.112  Again, a “near miss,” under Gerald, will not 
constitute “great bodily harm.”  The injury must be a “nearly-killed-
him.” 
The court, in State v. Anderson, was far clearer about what they 
would deem to be a qualifying injury.113  There, the victim suffered 
a laceration to his liver, and a physician testified at trial that the 
laceration was a “life-threatening” injury and that it was “a serious 
injury because if the bleeding does not stop or is not stopped, a 
person can bleed and die.”114 
Compared to the other categories of “great bodily harm” and 
thanks to the opinions in Gerald and Anderson, the concept of “high 
probability of death” probably is workable as is.  With the assistance 
of medical expertise, it is quite possible for jurors to evaluate 
questions regarding “How close to death was the victim?” and “How 
urgent was the medical intervention?” 
2. Serious Permanent Disfigurement 
When looking at the second category, “serious permanent 
disfigurement,” we again see a handful of published cases, and 
there are a few curious unpublished cases as well. 
Most of the cases pertain to significant lacerations and their 
resulting permanent scars.  In Anderson, the court held that a jury 
could find that a single scar running the length of the victim’s 
upper body qualified as serious permanent disfigurement.115  In 
State v. Currie, a 1987 case, the court held that numerous scars on 
the backs of child victims from being whipped with an extension 
cord supported the conclusion that the defendant inflicted “great 
bodily harm.”116  So, as of 1987, a single long scar on the upper 
body or numerous scars on the back were deemed sufficient 
evidence of “great bodily harm.” 
Moving forward to 1992, when the court was asked to review 
the two half-inch scars on the victim’s neck and ear in State v. 
Gerald, the court held that they did not “constitute ‘serious 
permanent disfigurement.’”117  The court stated that the two scars 
were “relatively small and in areas where they are not particularly 
 
 112.  Id. at 802. 
 113.  See 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  400 N.W.2d 361, 364–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 117.  486 N.W.2d at 802 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (1990)). 
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noticeable” and added, “the scars are significantly less extensive 
and pronounced than those [reviewed in Anderson and Currie.]”118  
The case comparison found in Gerald is somewhat helpful in 
identifying the demarcation line of “serious permanent 
disfigurement.”  As of 1992, one could accept that the scars in 
Gerald were not “great bodily harm” because they were smaller than 
those in Anderson, fewer than those in Currie, and were less 
noticeable, assuming that one does not take into account the 
victim’s ability to cover scars with clothing. 
But then three years later, in State v. McDaniel, the court of 
appeals held that a scar on the victim’s right center chest which was 
“two-thirds of an inch long” and a scar on his upper-right neck 
which was “six centimeters long” constituted “serious permanent 
disfigurement.”119  Contrasting the injuries with those in Gerald, the 
court said that the scars on the victim’s body in McDaniel are “larger 
and prominently located.”120  It is unclear from the opinions why 
the court believed that a scar on one’s chest or the upper right of 
the neck is more “prominently” located than on one’s ear or the 
back of one’s neck.  It’s also unclear why the court felt that the 
three-fourths-inch scar on the victim’s chest in McDaniel was so 
profoundly larger than the two one-half-inch scars on the victim in 
Gerald.  Moreover, there is no indication in any of these cases, and 
no reason to believe, that the court ever had an opportunity to see 
the injuries in the other cases. 
The court of appeals followed McDaniel three years later with 
an unpublished decision in State v. Bernal, which involved an assault 
with a beer bottle that caused a severe facial laceration and severed 
tragus of the ear, which required forty stitches to repair and left a 
prominent circular scar on the victim’s face.121  The court appeared 
to acknowledge the obvious, that the injuries were more severe 
than those present in Gerald, but also acknowledged that the 
victim’s injuries were not as severe as the victims’ injuries in Currie 
or Anderson.122  Then, with little analysis, the court stated that the 
injuries were “easily comparable” to the injuries in McDaniel and, 
on that basis, found sufficient evidence to support the jury 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  No. C3-97-535, 1998 WL 15905, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998). 
 122.  Id. at *4. 
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verdict.123  It is difficult, if not impossible, to take stock of McDaniel 
and Bernal and get a clear sense of why those injuries are so similar 
and why they both constitute serious permanent disfigurement.  By 
1998, then, the lines of demarcation in this category were getting 
fuzzier. 
The fuzziness on this issue became even more obvious in 2003 
when the court of appeals reviewed the victim’s injuries in State v. 
Demers to see whether they were sufficient to sustain a first-degree 
assault conviction.124  The court’s opinion in Demers probably best 
reveals that there is no clear indication of what size or how 
prominent a wound must be to be considered serious permanent 
disfigurement. 
In Demers, the female victim was stabbed in the abdomen, 
leaving her with two permanent scars on her abdomen above her 
navel, below her rib cage.125  “One scar is one-half to one inch in 
length; the other is three inches in length.  [The victim] testified 
that because of these scars she is embarrassed to wear a two-piece 
bathing suit or expose her stomach.”126  The court cited McDaniel, 
Anderson, and Gerald, but there was no discussion of how the court 
compared the injuries to the victim in Demers to the injuries of the 
other victims.  The court simply said, “Depending on her attire, 
[the victim]’s scars are visible and fall within the range of those 
considered great bodily harm as discussed in case law.  We 
therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in 
finding that [her] scars constitute great bodily harm.”127 
If there is an Exhibit No. 1 to prove why waiting for sufficiency-
of-the-evidence appellate decisions is a poor way to clarify the 
assault statutes, Demers would be it.  It strains credulity to believe 
that, somehow, the size and prominence of the respective injuries 
in Gerald and Demers should lead to amazingly different outcomes, 
considering the sentencing drop-off from a conviction for assault in 
the first degree to a conviction for assault in the third degree.128  
 
 123.  Id. at *5. 
 124.  No. CX-03-297, 2003 WL 22952813, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2003). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Ironically, Gerald is still cited for the proposition that a scar’s seriousness 
may depend on its size and location.  See, e.g., State v. Moua, No. A11-944, 2012 WL 
2505744, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 2, 2012) (holding that the victim’s facial scar 
was sufficient evidence of “serious permanent disfigurement” because it required a 
deep layer of sutures, was bite-shaped, was in a prominent location, and was 
noticeable when she testified).  
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The juxtaposition could cause a conscientious prosecutor to err on 
the side of caution and choose to not charge someone with assault 
in the first degree when the injury is somewhere in the 
Gerald/Demers/McDaniel range of injuries.  One might call the 
prosecutor’s caution “lenity” or “prudence,” but, if a defendant is 
not being held accountable for an offense that should be—or that 
the legislators or the public believe is—a first-degree assault level 
harm, then the prosecutor’s caution is another word for “injustice.”  
And it would be injustice created by the opacity of the statute.129 
Leaving the difficulties of the laceration and scar cases aside, 
in State v. Ali, the court of appeals reviewed a case in which the 
appellant bit “nearly one inch off the tip of the victim’s finger.”130  
At trial, the victim’s “treating physician referred to the injury as a 
‘partial amputation’ of the victim’s finger starting just above the 
 
 129.  For the reader’s benefit, it should be noted that the appellate courts have 
tried to clarify other, peripheral issues involving scars and “permanent 
disfigurement.”  First, in State v. Anderson, the appellant argued that the scar was 
not “permanent” because the victim could remove (and testified that she was 
considering removing) the scar by plastic surgery. 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995).  The court curtly rejected that argument with no comment, perhaps 
implying that medical interventions that could cover the disfigurement should not 
be considered when evaluating the injury.  Id.  Of course, the import of this is very 
unclear.  For example, what about cases in which a victim’s teeth are knocked out 
but then later reinserted by a dentist?  Are prosecutors and jurors supposed to 
ignore that the teeth are not gone?  Or does the dentist’s replacing the teeth 
reduce a “permanent loss” to a mere “temporary loss,” perhaps reducing the 
seriousness of an assault from an assault in the first degree to an assault in the 
third degree? 
  Second, in In re R.L.A., an unpublished case, the appellant successfully 
argued that expert medical testimony was needed to establish whether a facial 
laceration requiring over 200 stitches and resulting in extensive scarring 
constituted permanent disfigurement.  No. CX-87-2331, 1988 WL 56303, *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. June 7, 1988).  The court opined that, because the trial took place only 
six months since the incident, “[a]lthough easily observable, only an expert could 
knowledgeably ascertain the permanence of six-month old scars,” refusing to 
believe that a lay person could conclude that such a scar would not go away.  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
  Third, courts hold a defendant responsible for any permanent disfiguring 
injuries that result from medical intervention following an assault (e.g., surgical 
scars left during treatment of other injuries directly received in an assault).  State 
v. Curry, No. A09-986, 2010 WL 1753267 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 2010) (holding 
appellant responsible for causing the serious and permanently disfiguring surgical 
scar); Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706 (same). 
 130.  752 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
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base of the fingernail.”131  The court concluded “the loss of the tip 
of a finger is a ‘serious permanent disfigurement.’”132 
3. Serious Permanent or Protracted Loss or Impairment of the 
Function of Any Bodily Member or Organ 
When looking at the third category, permanent or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
the appellate courts again have reviewed only a few notable cases.  
The infrequency of cases may be because half of the injuries 
covered in this category, “loss of . . . any bodily member or organ,” 
are so obvious that no appellate attorney would dare raise a claim 
that the evidence was insufficient.  In other words, there likely 
could be little dispute that the loss of a body part such as an arm, 
ear, or kidney would not constitute “great bodily harm.”  A notable 
baseline case did arise in 2008, however, when the court reviewed 
State v. Ali, in which the appellant bit off “nearly one inch off the 
tip of the victim’s finger.”133  In a sign that the court will construe 
“bodily member” fairly broadly, even though the victim lost only 
the part of his finger “just above the base of the fingernail,” the 
court held that this loss constituted permanent loss or impairment 
of the function of a bodily member.134 
A more interesting type of injury discussed under this category 
relates to impairment of bodily functions due to nerve damage.  
One can look again to State v. Gerald, in which the state argued that 
the lacerations to the victim’s face that caused him to experience a 
“tightening or sensation” when he yawned or chewed qualified as a 
permanent loss or impairment.135  The court disagreed, holding 
that the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding.136  In 
explaining its decision, the court noted that medical testimony 
revealed that the victim’s “ability to perform bodily functions such 
as hear, chew, eat or breathe were not impaired by the injuries.”137  
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (holding that the injury is a “serious permanent disfigurement” or 
“‘permanent . . . loss or impairment of the function’ of any bodily member”) 
(citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2006)). 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2006)).  See also State v. 
Stapek, 315 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Minn. 1982) (holding that “permanent damage to 
the [victim]’s reproductive organs” constituted “great bodily harm”).  
 135.  State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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So, by 1992, it was clear that, to be a victim under this category of 
harm, a victim must experience more than merely a tightening in 
his jaw when yawning and eating. 
In 2004, in the unpublished State v. Jones case, the court 
encountered more nerve damage.138  The injuries suffered by the 
victim in Jones were similar to those found in Gerald, but the court 
found them sufficient to prove “protracted and possibly permanent 
loss or impairment of his facial nerves” and thus “great bodily 
harm.”139  In Jones, the victim was hit in the head with a baseball 
bat.140  Several weeks after the incident, the victim had “dysfunction 
of the left frontal branch of his facial nerves” and decreased 
sensation in his left anterior cheek.141  Five months after the 
incident, when the trial took place, the victim still experienced 
numbness on the left side of his face, loss of sensation on his left 
cheek, and difficulty talking, and he could not raise his left 
eyebrow.142  Medical testimony at trial indicated that the victim’s 
injuries “could take up to two years to heal or may never heal.”143  
Faced with this set of injuries, the court found that the victim’s 
injuries satisfied the element of “great bodily harm.”144 
Beyond nerve damage, the most interesting type of injury 
discussed under this category relates to the total loss of a tooth.  
Rather than treat tooth loss as a mere “fracture,” the court stated in 
State v. Bridgeforth that evidence that a victim lost a tooth in an 
assault was sufficient to prove “great bodily harm.”145  That is, rather 
than treat a tooth as simply a part of the skeletal system, the court 
surmised that, if a nose is a bodily member, as was concluded in 
State v. Stafford, then a tooth also must be a bodily member.146  
Indeed, the court then concluded in one sentence: “[T]he loss of a 
tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily member.”147  
The Bridgeforth holding is interesting because it has been the 
precedent used by practitioners for years in drawing the conclusion 
that, if a defendant busts a victim’s tooth out, he is guilty of assault 
 
 138.  No. A03-782, 2004 WL 1925052, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 146.  Id. (citing State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Minn. 1983)). 
 147.  Id. 
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in the first degree.  Indeed, it is one of the most common injuries 
that can transform what appears to be a one-punch misdemeanor-
assault case to a full-blown, prison-commit, first-degree assault 
felony trial.148 
It must be noted, however, that in 2005, in State v. Moore, the 
supreme court placed a giant asterisk on the Bridgeforth decision.149  
Moore was a case involving a first-degree assault conviction arising 
from an assault in which the victim lost a tooth.150  At trial, the 
district court followed Bridgeforth and instructed the jury that “the 
loss of a tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily 
member.”151  On appeal, the supreme court overturned the 
conviction, citing an error in the jury instructions.152  The supreme 
court stated that, by instructing the jury in that matter, it removed 
the question of whether the loss of a tooth is “great bodily harm” 
from the jury’s consideration, which was reversible error.153  The 
supreme court then clarified that Bridgeforth only stands for the 
proposition that the loss of a tooth provides sufficient evidence for a 
first-degree assault conviction.154  It does not mean that, as a matter 
of law, a loss of a tooth is “great bodily harm.”  Leaving the fact-
question/legal-question issue aside, the dilemma in Moore is 
another excellent example of why Minnesota should not be using 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases to clarify its assault statutes.  
Essentially, it leads practitioners to say, “The supreme court has 
decided that a loss of a tooth is great bodily harm, but it would be 
reversible error to tell jurors that it is.  The parties will have to just 
argue about it and let the jurors decide that for themselves.”  It is 
an absurd conundrum, compounded by the thought of the 
unfortunate conversation that the prosecutor in Moore would have 
had with the victim when explaining why there would have to be a 
second trial. 
 
 148.  Anecdotally, prosecutors often do not charge assaults that cause tooth 
loss as first-degree assaults because the presumptive sentence of the offense would 
far exceed the prosecutor’s sense of what an appropriate disposition for the 
conduct would be. 
 149.  699 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2005). 
 150.  Id. at 736. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 737. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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4. Other Serious Bodily Harm 
When looking at the fourth category, “other serious bodily 
harm,” the appellate courts have found that very disparate injuries 
(or, more accurately, collections of injuries) can satisfy the statute.  
The courts have relied on this category as a sort of catch-all 
category that allows the affirmation of a conviction through a 
finding that “at the very least” a victim’s injuries “fit within the 
phrase ‘other serious bodily harm.’”155  The courts emphasize that, 
even if an injury does not fit into the other categories of “great 
bodily harm,” for an injury to be considered “other serious bodily 
harm,” it must be “in the same kind or class” as the other three 
categories of injuries stated with particularity in the statute.156  
There is little discussion on what the “same kind or class” would be 
because what the courts have ended up seeing on appeal typically 
has not been just a single injury to consider.  Instead, the courts 
have been confronted with cases involving victims that suffered 
numerous injuries which, in themselves, would not be “great bodily 
harm” but, taken together, warrant the maximum prosecution of a 
first-degree assault charge (and the presumptive prison-commit 
sentence that the assault deserves). 
In State v. Jones, the supreme court held that there was 
sufficient evidence of other serious bodily harm when the victim 
was found unconscious, was hospitalized for a week, and suffered 
numbness, dizziness, and headaches.157  On its own, loss of 
consciousness is considered substantial bodily harm, but, when it is 
accompanied by all of the injuries the victim in Jones suffered, the 
court found the collection of injuries to be “great bodily harm.” 
Similarly, in State v. Anderson, the court of appeals concluded 
that “a lacerated liver, a laceration on her head which required 
stitches, bruises, other head injuries which caused lapses of 
consciousness, and a long scar running the length of her upper 
body” would qualify as “other serious bodily harm.”158 
However, when reviewing the injuries to the victim in Gerald, 
which again were just two half-inch lacerations on the head, the 
court held that, even if stitches are required to repair the injuries, 
they would not constitute “great bodily harm.”159 
 
 155.  State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1978). 
 156.  State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 157.  Jones, 266 N.W.2d at 710. 
 158.  Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706. 
 159.  State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
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Following Jones, the court in State v. Barner reviewed an assault 
in which the evidence revealed: 
Defendant in this case hit the victim so hard in the head 
that the victim’s head swelled up, making it difficult for 
him to eat for three days; defendant inflicted multiple 
stab wounds, one 4 inches deep and the rest 2 inches 
deep, leaving multiple scars; and defendant injured the 
victim’s hand in such a way as to affect the way the victim, 
an avid canoeist, paddles his canoe.160 
Rather than proceed with a discussion of each category of 
great bodily harm, the court, quoting Jones, wrote, “‘[a]t the very 
least’ . . . the injuries ‘fit within the phrase “other serious bodily 
harm.”‘“161 
This sort of cursory conclusion, of course, leaves a great deal 
on which to speculate, and curious prosecutors are left to wonder 
whether, on their own, injuries leading to difficulty with eating or 
paddling would be sufficient to proceed on a charge of first-degree 
assault.  However, in the least, one can see the benefit of the catch-
all category when facing a case involving a complex multiple-injury 
assault.  Rather than seeing a set or series of fifth-degree or third-
degree assaults, a prosecutor can charge a defendant with a single 
count of first-degree assault.  Perhaps this is the singular 
justification for the category anyway.162 
 
 
 160.  510 N.W.2d 202, 202 (Minn. 1993). 
 161.  Id. (citations omitted); see also State v. Sconiers, No. CX-96-1140, 1997 
WL 118247, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1997) (citing Barner and noting that 
“courts have found ‘other serious bodily harm’ under the statute where a victim’s 
injuries were extensive and severe”). 
 162.  Anecdotally, prosecutors of child abuse also occasionally seek to utilize 
this category when reviewing assault cases involving head injuries to infants that, 
thanks to prompt medical intervention, did not create “a high probability of 
death” or easily identifiable “permanent or protracted loss or impairment” but 
nonetheless shock the conscience and warrant maximum prosecution.  As it is 
defined, “great bodily harm” does not distinguish overtly between an adult’s 
injuries and an infant’s injuries, but, given the looseness in the definition of “great 
bodily harm,” the issue of whether significant head trauma to an infant is “other 
serious bodily harm” is not clear.  Thus, there is room for prosecutorial discretion 
to charge such a case.  And, if a prosecutor charges the case and a district court 
judge signs a complaint for first-degree assault, the great-bodily-harm element 
simply will be left to lay jurors as a question of fact.  Under this scenario, there 
exists the potential for inconsistent outcomes of similarly situated defendants. 
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V. WISCONSIN 
Following a discussion of the Minnesota assault-statute regime, 
Wisconsin’s regime should be familiar territory.  Like Minnesota, 
Wisconsin’s Criminal Code has three levels of assault, which differ 
only in regard to three levels of injury suffered by the victim, and 
those levels of injury are called “bodily harm,” “substantial bodily 
harm,” and “great bodily harm.”163  Assaults causing “bodily harm” 
are misdemeanors, and assaults causing either “substantial” or 
“great bodily harm” are felonies.164  Also, Minnesota and Wisconsin 
share almost identical definitions of “bodily harm” and “great 
bodily harm.”165  With all of this similarity, what is so special about 
our neighbors to the east?  It is their definition of “substantial 
bodily harm,” which gets rid of all of the tea-leaf reading and talk of 
“temporary but substantial” injuries. 
A. Wisconsin’s “Substantial Bodily Harm” 
In its definition of “substantial bodily harm,” the Wisconsin 
legislature created a list of qualifying injuries that it wanted to be 
considered sufficient for a felony charge.  In Wisconsin, 
“substantial bodily harm” means “bodily injury that causes a 
laceration which requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any 
fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary 
loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or 
fracture of a tooth.”166 
Rather than using the “temporary but substantial” language 
 
 163.  WIS. STAT. ANN § 940.19 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 286).  The only 
minor nuance is that, in cases in which a victim suffers great bodily harm, if the 
state can prove that the defendant intended to cause great bodily harm, then he will be 
punished more severely than if the state can prove only than he intended to cause 
mere bodily harm.  Compare id. § 940.19(4), with id. § 940.19(5).   
 164.  Id. § 940.19. 
 165.  Compare id. § 939.22(4), (14), with MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7–8 
(2012).  One particular case illustrates that the bar for “bodily harm” presumably 
is as low as Minnesota’s.  In State v. Higgs, the defendant threw urine in the victim’s 
eyes, “causing a burning and stinging sensation.”  601 N.W.2d 653, 660 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1999).  The court determined that the victim’s description of the sensation 
she felt was “pain” and thus “bodily harm.”  Id. 
 166.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22(38) (Westlaw).  It is noteworthy that the 
legislature specifically includes two disfiguring injuries not previously discussed in 
this article: burns and petechia.  The addition of petechial hemorrhaging 
occurred only within the past decade.  See Act of Mar. 20, 2008, sec. 3, 
§ 939.22(38), 2007 Wis. Acts 127, 127 (amending the statutory definition of 
“substantial bodily harm” in section 939.22 (38) to include a petechia). 
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found in Minnesota’s definition of “substantial bodily harm” and 
asking prosecutors and jurors to figure out whether an injury fits 
under the statute, Wisconsin eliminates that interpretive step.  By 
“cutting out the middle man,” Wisconsin makes the mathematics 
easier and less subject to ambiguity and misinterpretation. 
The benefits should be immediately obvious.  Instead of 
fiddling with whether a particular laceration should qualify as 
“temporary but substantial disfigurement,” the Wisconsin 
legislature simply lists that any laceration that requires stitches, 
staples, or a tissue adhesive is “substantial bodily harm.”  In 
Minnesota, it is common for prosecutors to believe that a laceration 
that requires stitches is “substantial bodily harm,” to charge a case 
on that belief, and to proceed to trial with that belief.  However, as 
the statute and case law stand, the prosecutor still must argue that 
such a laceration fits the words “temporary but substantial 
disfigurement,” and a defense attorney still can argue that it is not.  
And any individual juror can decide on his or her own that the 
injury is not substantial enough, causing a hung jury or acquittal.  
There is no need for such looseness in the joints.167  Wisconsin’s 
statute fixes this problem. 
Other benefits to Wisconsin’s definition of “substantial bodily 
harm” are apparent.  Instead of requiring a jury to figure out what 
“loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
 
 167.  Anecdotally, in a Hennepin County District Court trial in the summer of 
2012, a skilled and experienced colleague of mine tried a third-degree assault case 
in which the victim was whacked in the forehead with a skateboard and suffered a 
laceration that required several stitches to repair.  In closing argument, and for 
the first time in the proceeding, defense counsel argued that the laceration was 
not “substantial disfigurement.”  In rebuttal, the prosecutor was left with little 
response beyond visually displaying displeasure at defense counsel’s challenge to a 
belief that virtually all criminal-law practitioners in Minnesota ascribe.  In terms of 
what was said to the jury, however, she was left to say only “Yes, it is!” and run 
through the definition of substantial bodily harm.  There were no other pertinent 
elements of the offense at issue.  After deliberation, the jury found the defendant 
not guilty.  Obviously, despite the tea leaves left by the unpublished laceration 
cases cited above, there is nothing in statute or case law to help determine that an 
injury indeed should be considered substantial bodily harm or not.  The jurors 
were left to work through what should be deemed “substantial” for themselves, 
which seems oddly subjective and arbitrary.  Inviting a jury to evaluate credibility is 
one thing, and jurors do a marvelous job at it.  But, why should they be asked to 
determine whether a laceration that requires stitches to repair should be ascribed 
the adjective “substantial”?  Presumably, all parties, including the defendant, the 
court, defense counsel, the jury, and the prosecutor, would have preferred to see 
the issue resolved earlier in the process, most obviously via clearer, additional 
legislative guidance. 
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organ” means, the Wisconsin legislature specifies what the areas of 
concern are: loss of consciousness, sight, and hearing.  
Additionally, by specifically listing “concussion” as a form of 
“substantial bodily harm,” one may assume the legislature is 
referring to impairment of brain function, which is how 
concussions typically are defined and described.168  The Wisconsin 
statute demystifies “substantial bodily harm” and makes the 
mathematics obvious and clinical, as it should be. 
Another benefit is that, instead of using the term “fracture of 
any bodily member,” the Wisconsin legislature uses several terms to 
clarify what it deems substantial injury: (1) fracture of a bone, (2) 
broken nose, or (3) loss or fracture of a tooth.  Bone fractures and 
broken noses are considered “substantial bodily harm” in 
Minnesota, but Wisconsin clears up the issue of teeth.  The statute 
clarifies that Wisconsin refuses to distinguish between a fracture of 
a tooth and fracture of a bone, and it specifies that a loss of a tooth 
should not be considered “great bodily harm.”  So, on the issue of 
tooth loss, Wisconsin diverges from Minnesota, perhaps 
appropriately, by treating the injury less seriously.  But the statute 
brings clarity, and it avoids the legal-issue/fact-issue problem 
identified in the Moore decision previously discussed.  Jurors in 
Wisconsin are not left having to play “connect-the-dots,” as they are 
in Minnesota. 
B. Wisconsin’s “Great Bodily Harm” 
Wisconsin has not modified its definition of “great bodily 
harm” to list specific injuries; it retains the same language 
embraced by the MPC over fifty years ago.  Indeed, given the age of 
the statute, it should be no surprise that the hand-wringing over the 
concept of “great bodily harm” has taken place a few times since 
Wisconsin implemented its modern assault-statute regime in the 
1950s.169  Just like in Minnesota, the issue of what constitutes “great 
bodily harm” typically arises in Wisconsin on sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claims, and, just like in Minnesota, the Wisconsin courts 
have struggled finding the demarcation line.170  The Wisconsin 
 
 168.  See, e.g., State v. McKague, 246 P.3d 558, 564–66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) 
(discussing concussions and holding that a concussion on its own, absent loss of 
consciousness, rose to the level of substantial bodily harm under Washington law). 
 169.  See State v. Bronston, 97 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Wis. 1959) (discussing changes 
in Wisconsin’s aggravated battery statute). 
 170.  See, e.g., id. at 506–07.  Here, the court was asked to review the sufficiency 
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Court of Appeals explicitly conceded that point in 1999, when it 
stated, “‘it is not easy as a matter of law to draw the line of 
demarcation between “great bodily harm” and other levels of 
bodily harm.’”171  The court acknowledged that, given the current 
statutory definition of “great bodily harm,” the issue of whether an 
injury constitutes “great bodily harm” must “fall into a twilight zone” 
of jury fact-finding and deliberation.172  In other words, the court 
acknowledged that, as part of the judicial branch, it can only 
interpret the words of the statute; it cannot complete the 
purportedly mysterious fact-finding chore with which lay jurors are 
tasked.173 
There is little value in running through more case law from 
Wisconsin to illustrate that its appellate courts have struggled with 
placing certain injuries on either side of the “great bodily harm” 
dividing line.  They appear to have had the same problems with 
interpretation and inconsistency that Minnesota has had and 
should now try to avoid. 
Fortunately, the examination of Wisconsin’s assault-statute 
regime points to a proposal on how to improve the situation in 
Minnesota. 
VI. PROPOSAL 
The discussion in Part IV of this article supports the notion 
that, in Minnesota, there is a lack of clarity in the definitions of 
“substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm.”  Given the lack 
of clarity, there is too great a potential for confusion, arbitrary 
interpretation, unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants, 
 
of the evidence supporting an aggravated-battery (equivalent to first-degree 
assault) conviction involving a victim who was struck on the head by the defendant 
with a wrench, causing a two-inch scalp laceration, causing her to be hospitalized 
for a few hours, and causing her headaches and pain in the jaw for some time after 
the assault.  Reviewing the testimony, the court observed that the victim testified 
that she no longer had pain.  The court acknowledged that its state’s new statute 
“is not concerned with the potentialities of the offender’s act but only with its end 
result.”  Id. at 508.  It swiftly noted that, because the victim no longer felt pain, she 
did not suffer “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 
victim did not suffer great bodily harm.   
 171.  State v. Rodriguez, No. 2008AP2520-CR, 2010 WL 94032, at *3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting State v. Flores, 250 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Wis. 1977)). 
 172.  Id. (quoting Flores, 250 N.W.2d at 724) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 173.  See id. at *2, *4. 
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and injustice.  The discussion in Part V of the Wisconsin statutory 
regime points to a way to reduce the potential for confusion. 
This article presents a simple proposal: in short, the Minnesota 
legislature should either adopt the explicit language used in 
Wisconsin’s definition of “substantial bodily harm” or at least follow 
its approach in identifying the specific injuries that should be 
covered under the term.  Doing so would clear up many of the 
confusions discussed in Part IV, and it would allow prosecutors to 
make easier and more consistent charging decisions.  Certainly, this 
change is not intended to benefit just prosecutors.  Doing so may 
save a defendant from being charged with a felony offense.  It also 
would save jurors from having to make the difficult evaluations of 
injuries in their deliberation rooms, which indeed should be less 
mysterious places than the “twilight zone.”  Thus, there are 
multiple reasons why modifying the statute would be just and serve 
multiple beneficiaries. 
The Minnesota legislature also should follow this approach in 
adopting a new definition of “great bodily harm.”  It is evident that 
this has not been done in Wisconsin to date, but the Minnesota 
legislature should not conclude that it would be impossible to craft 
a definition of “great bodily harm” that would provide more clarity 
to practitioners.  Indeed, even if the legislature broke down the 
definition in the form of a simpler list, the potential for confusion 
could be minimized.  The list could begin with fairly non-
controversial types of bodily injuries, including injuries that: 
1. Create a high probability of death; 
2. Cause the permanent loss of any bodily member or organ; or 
3. Cause the permanent or protracted loss of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, such as hearing, chewing, eating, 
and breathing. 
These are three categories which are fairly straightforward and 
which, according to the review of appellate decisions above, appear 
to have involved far fewer confusions and controversies.  The 
addition of the non-exclusive list of bodily functions in the third 
category is intended to help clarify the class of bodily functions 
which, if lost, would constitute “great bodily harm.” 
The legislature would then need to determine how to clarify 
the concept of “serious permanent disfigurement.”  This article 
proposes the following language: 
4. Prominent scarring or other permanent disfigurement of the 
skin. 
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The new term used in the proposed language, of course, is 
“prominent,” which was selected because the Minnesota appellate 
courts have used the concept in this context for decades.174  The 
word “prominence” has a number of definitions, but it typically 
refers to items which stand out, which are easily seen, which are 
conspicuous, which are particularly noticeable, etc.175  Looking at 
the cases cited in Part IV, it is clear that what the legislature is 
concerned about is disfigurement that tends to (1) cause victims to 
change their behavior to avoid exposure to others and/or (2) make 
victims feel considerable embarrassment or shame when their 
disfigurement is visible to others.  The concept of “prominence” 
addresses both of these concerns.  This language could assist 
prosecutors, jurors, and appellate courts in determining what types 
of scars should be counted as “great bodily harm.”  While this 
category still does not involve a cut-and-dry, explicit description of 
specific qualifying injuries, when appellate litigation arises 
involving this new statutory language, there would be a more 
workable definition for the appellate courts to explicate and to apply 
to disparate factual scenarios involving scars. 
Lastly, the Minnesota legislature should find a way to modify 
the catch-all category of “other serious bodily harm.”  This article 
proposes the following replacement: 
5. Two separate and distinct injuries, each of which constitutes 
substantial bodily harm, arising from the same course of 
conduct. 
As the reader may recall, a review of the case law suggests that 
the category of “other serious bodily harm” is treated mainly as a 
repository for complex multi-injury assaults.  There does not 
appear to be any specific appellate case in which an individual 
injury was not covered by the other categories of “great bodily 
harm” but was deemed to fit exclusively in the category of “other 
serious bodily harm.”  In the cases which discussed “other serious 
bodily harm,” there were victims who had received multiple 
injuries, more than one of which individually constitutes 
“substantial bodily harm,” and it seemed apparent that the amount 
of harm caused by the defendants in those cases justified charging 
and convicting them of an offense more serious than assault in the 
 
 174.  See, e.g., State v. Moua, No. A11-944, 2012 WL 2505744, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 2, 2012); State v. McDaniel, 534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 175.  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1403 
(4th ed. 2009) (defining “prominent”). 
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third degree.  The language chosen above would address that type 
of case. 
The language chosen, while broad enough to cover complex 
assaults, is intended to provide two limitations.  First, the two 
injuries must be significantly different.  For example, it would not 
allow a prosecutor to charge first-degree assault for an assault 
involving two fractured ribs received in the same assault.  In such a 
case, two fractured ribs would not be distinct.  Second, the two 
injuries would have to derive from one assaultive incident.  For 
example, this category of harm would not allow a prosecutor to 
charge first-degree assault if, on one day, the defendant fractured 
the victim’s rib and, the next day, broke his nose.  Such a situation 
would constitute two separate assaults.  Also, it would not allow a 
prosecutor to charge first-degree assault if a defendant punched a 
victim once in the face, knocking him unconscious and causing a 
laceration that required stitches to repair.  Those two injuries, 
although distinct, are not separate from each other; they were 
caused by a single voluntary act.176 
Taking account of these five proposed categories of “great 
bodily harm,” it appears that almost all of the injuries that currently 
are considered “great bodily harm” would remain covered.  
However, the new language would be clearer, more helpful, and 
more objective.  Surely, there would be issues to resolve if this 
statutory regime is adopted.  However, this article’s intent is not to 
present a complete piece of legislation or a complete defense of 
the proposal that has been sketched; it is to identify a problem and 
to point toward a potential solution. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The task of making a charging decision in a felony-assault case 
is not one that any ethical prosecutor takes lightly.  One would 
hope that the charging decisions that prosecutors make would be 
easy and mathematical, but charging decisions rarely are, as not 
every aspect of a case is reducible to presenting an accurate map or 
solving an algebraic equation.  Nevertheless, this article has looked 
at Minnesota’s assault-statute regime and pointed to a problem that 
makes charging decisions potentially more subjective and arbitrary 
 
 176.  Alternatively, if a suspect knocked a victim unconscious and then kicked 
the victim in the ribs, causing a fracture, the prosecutor would have the discretion 
to consider charging assault in the first degree. 
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than they should or need to be.  Specifically, the article has 
discussed the concepts of “substantial bodily harm” and “great 
bodily harm,” which are the defining, distinguishing concepts in 
Minnesota’s felony assault statutes.  There is little justification for 
why these concepts are as unclear as they are.  This article presents 
the hope that, with a modest amount of legislative change, the 
charging of felony assaults can become a little bit more 
mathematical. 
Ideally, evaluating whether an injury in a new case is 
tantamount to “substantial bodily harm” or “great bodily harm” 
would require only some sort of “box-checking.”  In contrast to the 
ideal, as this article reveals, the current definitions of these terms 
complicate and often prevent simple categorization of an injury.  
This article has presented reasons and examples intended to 
compel the reader to believe that the Minnesota legislature should 
improve and clarify the definitions of “substantial bodily harm” and 
“great bodily harm.” 
This article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of 
“substantial bodily harm” by adopting Wisconsin’s definition 
because Wisconsin clearly specifies a list of injuries.  Adopting 
Wisconsin’s definition would be helpful to all practitioners, jurors, 
and defendants, and it would make the criminal justice system 
more just.  This change also would continue to build on the 
element-analysis philosophy and goals of the MPC. 
This article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of 
“great bodily harm” by trying to make a clearer and more explicit 
list of the types of injuries which should be included.  The exact 
proposal in the article does not present a radical change to the 
current regime, except that it attempts to provide a clearer 
definition of the type of permanent disfigurement that should be 
considered “great bodily harm.”  It also dispenses with the category 
of “other serious bodily harm” by creating a category that can be 
used when victims receive multiple substantial injuries in the same 
assaultive incident. 
These statutory modifications should improve the ease and 
consistency in the charging of felony assault cases, and they have 
the potential for increasing justice and fairness for defendants and 
for the public.  These changes are ones which hopefully all 
conscientious practitioners, legislators, and citizens would support. 
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